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Getting It for You Wholesale: Making




In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has used
bankruptcy cases to score rhetorical points against Congress. The
Court regularly complains about the ambiguities of the Bankruptcy
Code's text' and about the lack of help provided by its legislative
history.2 From time to time, in exasperation and as if to teach
Congress a lesson, the Court applies the Code mechanically,3
showing little care about the impact on the bankruptcy system.
Apparently Justices unlucky enough to land the tiresome task of
solving another tangled bankruptcy conundrum amuse themselves
by working out the nuances of pet theories of statutory interpreta-
tion.4 It is a good thing that, as Professor Frank Kennedy has
* Roger Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. The
author wishes to thank Karen Gross for comments on an earlier version of this article and
Michael Smith and Amy Peery for research assistance.
1. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416 (1992) (noting ambiguity in the text and
stating that it would be difficult to interpret section 506 in one opinion so as to cover various
hypothetical applications that come to mind).
2. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 n.4 (1997) (giving
"no weight" to legislative history and calling it "unedifying," consisting of "snippets that
might support either standard of valuation"); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489
U.S. 235, 243 n.6 (1989) (noting lack of legislative history to shed light on the issue of
whether a nonconsensual oversecured creditor can recover postpetition interest for the
pendency period of a Chapter 11 case).
3. An example where Congress learned the "lesson" is in its response to Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990), by amending the
Bankruptcy Code to make criminal restitution obligations nondischargeable in Chapter 13
as well as in Chapter 7. See Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581,
§ 3, 104 Stat. 2865 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (1994)).
4. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 551 (1993) (dating the Supreme
Court's increased reliance on statutory text to the 1986 term, when Justice Scalia joined the
Court). For a good synopsis of Justice Scalia's approach to bankruptcy interpretation, see
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written, "the bankruptcy system is able to survive abuse and neglect
from the Supreme Court ....
Given this recent history, it is amusing to see the Court
produce a bankruptcy opinion, Associates Commercial Corp. v.
Rash,6 of near perfect ambiguity, all the while extolling the virtues
of predictability, uniformity and simplicity.7 The Court in Rash
adopts "the replacement-value standard" for valuation of collateral
retained by a debtor in a Chapter 13 cramdown.8 With one
breath, it rejects "a ruleless approach allowing use of different
valuation standards based on the facts and circumstances of
individual cases,"9 while with the next, it "leaves to bankruptcy
courts, as triers of fact, identification of the best way of ascertaining
replacement value on the basis of the evidence presented"1 and
Delphically directs an inquiry that "will depend on the type of
debtor and the nature of the property.""
Dewnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 432-35, (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that the
Court "irrelevantly observes" that its interpretation makes the Code fairer in terms of
natural justice because "a bankruptcy law has little to do with natural justice"). See also
Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving "Plain
Meaning" Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 1636 (1993)
(analyzing the development of the "plain meaning" approach over the course of 13 Supreme
Court decisions); Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and
Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV.
823, 828-829 (1991) (dating the switch from policy-based interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Code to a plain meaning approach to about 1990 on the basis of a comparison of Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), and Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 495 U.S. at
552)).
5. See Frank Kennedy, Williamsburg Conf. on Bankruptcy: Critique of the First Decade
Under the Bankruptcy Code and Agenda for Reform, Conclusions of the Panels and
Transcripts of Proceedings, Oct. 17-18, 1988, at 36 (ALI-ABA Invitational Conf.,
Williamburg, Va.). See also Tabb & Lawless, supra note 4, at 825-826 (quoting this comment
by Kennedy).
6. See 117 S. Ct. at 1879.
7. See id. at 1886.
8. See id. at 1882. Chapter 13 permits a debtor to confirm a repayment plan over a
secured creditor's objection by paying the secured creditor the present value of its allowed
secured claim, determined by the value of its collateral. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii),
506(a). "Cramdown" is the colloquial name for this feature of Chapter 13 and a similar
feature of Chapters 11 and 12. See id. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii). Present
value is required because of the language that the amount of the claim must be paid "as of
the effective date of the plan" under section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), so that to the extent payment
is deferred, interest must also be paid.
9. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.5.
10. See id. at 1886 n.6.
11. See id.
[Vol. 102:4
1998] BANKRUPTCY VALUATION OF COLLATERAL
The good news about Rash is that it leaves the bankruptcy
courts to clean up the mess as they see fit. For the most part,
bankruptcy judges care about making sense of bankruptcy law.
The bad news is that the bankruptcy courts will use, indeed already
have used, an array of methods to do the job, reproducing the lack
of clarity and uniformity that preceded Rash.12
Lack of certainty is particularly problematic in consumer
bankruptcy, where debtors' lawyers are prone to take the safest
course, rather than being willing to make legal arguments and to
bring appeals where necessary to establish favorable interpretations
for their clients.13 Most consumer cases are done for small fixed
fees. 4 Debtors' lawyers want to be able to state values in sched-
ules and not have to defend them. Creditor challenges, or even the
possibility of them, will make many lawyers peg value at a high
and, thus, noncontroversial value. 5
In this context, it is important that bankruptcy courts create a
rule, not a standard, for determining collateral value in a Chapter
13 cramdown, an issue that probably arises in more than a hundred
thousand cases a year.16  The argument of this article is that
12. See discussion infra notes 62-89.
13. See Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed
Choices-A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 172-
179 (1997) (concerning pressures on debtors' lawyers to go along with the rules of thumb of
bankruptcy judges and Chapter 13 trustees about how much unsecured debt repayment is
necessary to insure routine confirmation).
14. See WEFA GROUP, THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY, February
1998, at 14 (citing a 1997 study conducted by Visa and partially funded by Mastercard;
average attorneys' fees were $505 in Chapter 7 and $1000 in Chapter 13).
15. An example of the phenomenon of debtors' lawyers avoiding controversy is the
large numbers of reaffirmations of unsecured debt they permit in Chapter 7. See Report of
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Oct. 20,1997, at 153-154 [hereinafter Commis-
sion Report]. If an unsecured creditor requests a reaffirmation, the debtor's attorney may
fear that a discharge challenge will follow if the debtor does not reaffirm. This leads many
consumer debtors' attorneys to acquiesce to reaffirmation.
In Simmons v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 224 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998), the
bankruptcy court actually suggests, in the wake of Rash that debtors should peg value at
retail price to avoid litigation. Even that strategy is insufficient to avoid the costs of
challenging creditors' proofs of claims asserting collateral value in excess of retail value, a
practice that the Simmons court declined to check. The court in Simmons dismissed
plaintiff's action seeking to represent a class of debtors and get injunctive relief, under 11
U.S.C. § 105(a), from a Ford Motor Credit Co. practice of filing proofs of claim asserting
fully secured claims when the debt exceeded the original price of a motor vehicle.
16. See Visa Reports 1.3 Million Consumer Filings in 1997, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS,
Jan. 29, 1998, at 1 (1.3 million consumer cases filed in 1997). See also Teresa A. Sullivan et.
al, Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts
1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 143 (stating that Chapter 13 cases represented about 28
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bankruptcy courts should clearly state that "replacement value," as
that term is used by the Supreme Court in Rash, means wholesale
value in a Chapter 13 cramdown. In addition, they should state
that, for motor vehicles, replacement value can be established by
means of "book"'7 wholesale value, with upward and downward
adjustments permitted based on proof of special circumstances such
as better or worse than average condition. These pronouncements
might best be accomplished by local rule, 8 without the need for
litigation. Otherwise, we will be treated to the absurdity of dozens
of cases, and maybe more, litigating over relatively small
amounts.19
An advantage of interpreting replacement value as equiva-
lent to wholesale value is that this approach skips-so to
speak-the middleman (Congress) and allows direct judicial
implementation of a recommendation of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission.2" Although it would be comforting to have
Congress bless this approach, the bills introduced in the 105th
Congress mostly ignored the Commission's many fine recommenda-
tions while pursuing the dubious idea of means testing consumer
percent of all bankruptcy cases filed in 1991, up from 24 percent in 1981). Thus, more than
300,000 Chapter 13 cases arise a year, and, if only a third of them involve cars worth less
than loan amount outstanding, valuation arises more than 100,000 times a year on cars alone.
See id.
17. See notes 91-110 for a discussion of book values, including information obtained in
a telephone interview with Patricia Erny, Managing Editor of the N.A.D.A. Official Used
Car Guide [hereinafter Erny Interview]. There are two major "books" that give used car
values, the N.A.D.A. Official Used Car Guide [hereinafter N.A.D.A. Guide] and the Kelley
Auto Market Report Blue Book [hereinafter Kelley Blue Book]. The N.A.D.A. Guide is
published monthly in regional editions by a for-profit subsidiary of the National Automobile
Dealers' Association, an industry trade association. See Erny interview.
18. See In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1997) (concerning pre-Rash local rule that
set valuation of motor vehicles at the average of trade-in and retail values, including options
and mileage, as contained in the Eastern Edition of the N.A.D.A. Guide for the month the
petition was filed "unless otherwise determined by the court"). See also In re Glueck, 223
B.R. 514, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998) (concerning local rule setting average of retail and
wholesale book value as method for determining cramdown value of automobile). But see
Mary Josephine Newborn Wiggins, Globalism, Parochialism and Procedure: A Critical Assess-
ment of Local Rulemaking in Bankruptcy Court, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1245 (1995) (raising
concerns about the proliferation of local rules as unduly complicating bankruptcy practice).
19. See In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997) (litigating a $300 valuation
dispute). See also In re Younger, No. BK-97-18955-LN, 1998 WL 13681, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. Jan. 12, 1998) (noting that in that bankruptcy district, 3,000 Chapter 13 cases were filed
in 1997 and that "litigation of the valuation dispute is not economically justifiable in most
cases").
20. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 243-58.
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bankruptcy.2" The failure of these bills was justly deserved.
Unfortunately, the credit industry is likely to continue its campaign
for legislation to tighten up on access to bankruptcy relief even as
it expands high risk lending, making sensible bankruptcy reform
unlikely in the near future. In this climate, the congressional
course most fervently to be hoped for is no bankruptcy legislation
at all. This article proceeds on the assumption that the bankruptcy
courts will have to make sense of Rash without any help from
Congress. Part II of this Article critiques the analysis in Rash.
Part III explains why, under Rash and on the basis of sound policy,
bankruptcy courts should use wholesale value for purposes of
Chapter 13 cramdown valuation. Part IV discusses the need for
caution about using Rash in other valuation settings, especially in
Chapter 11.
II. Rash Words
In Rash, the Supreme Court faced the issue of how to value
collateral retained by a debtor in a Chapter 13 cramdown. In a
majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court specifically rejected
both a "foreclosure-value standard" and a "split-the-difference"
midpoint of retail and wholesale value.22 The Court instead
adopted a "replacement value standard," but unfortunately it
poorly explained what is meant by that phrase. Three footnotes
only add to the murk. First, the Court states that replacement
value means "the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade,
business, or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain property
21. See Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing
as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Proposals as a Starting
Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INSTIT. L. REV. 1 (1998). See discussion infra notes 113-16 (concerning
the problems in the bills' valuation provisions).
22. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882, 1885-86 (1997).
"Foreclosure value" is itself a confusing term because it may tend to suggest that an
artificially low bid-in price at a foreclosure sale is what a secured party realizes on collateral,
when, in fact, the secured party is more likely to realize wholesale value upon a second sale
to a dealer. See text at notes 117-21, infra. The Supreme Court does not discuss what it
means by foreclosure value (the initial sale, often by public auction, or the second sale after
a bid-in at auction, often at wholesale value). The Bankruptcy Court in Rash in fact did not
use a depressed foreclosure sale price but rather used wholesale value as the measure of the
collateral's worth. See In re Rash, 149 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
The "split-the-difference" approach (average of retail and wholesale book values) had
been used by the Seventh Circuit in In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1996). The
Supreme Court at one point oddly characterized (or mischaracterized) what the Seventh
Circuit did as using "the midpoint between foreclosure value and replacement value."
1998]
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of like age and condition."23 Next, it rejects a "ruleless," "case-
by-case" approach.24 Finally, it "leaves to bankruptcy courts, as
triers of fact, identification of the best way of ascertaining replace-
ment value on the basis of the evidence presented" and states that
replacement value does not include "the value of items the debtor
does not receive when he retains" collateral, "items such as
warranties, inventory storage and reconditioning. '
In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation, it is no longer
worth belaboring points about how section 506(a) of the Bankrupt-
cy Code could have been read differently.26 Differences in
interpretation have tended to revolve around whether a reader
focuses on the first or second sentence of that subsection. The first
sentence uses the creditor's perspective ("the value of such
creditor's interest"), while the second refers to "the purposes of the
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use" of the collateral.
Emphasizing the first sentence, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, en banc, held in Rash that valuation "should
start with what the creditor could realize if it repossessed and sold
the collateral pursuant to its security agreement .... ,27 Empha
sizing the second sentence, the Supreme Court reversed and, as
noted above, used "replacement value."'  Justice Stevens in his
dissent gives a good synopsis of how to reconcile the two sentences:
that the first sentence refers to the value of collateral to the
creditor,' while the second sentence is flagging the "utility"
character of section 506(a), which applies throughout the various
chapters of the Code, so that in the context of Rash, the second
sentence means only that valuation of the creditor's interest is to
be done for purposes of a Chapter 13 cramdown.29
The Court's policy analysis, if one can so dignify it, is abbrevi-
ated and oddly selective. One might even call it result-oriented,
but that charge would make the debatable assumption that the
23. See id. at 1884, n.2.
24. See id. at 1886, n.5.
25. See id. at 1886, n.6. It should be noted that the willing-buyer-willing-seller standard
in n.2 is qualified by a direction at the end of that note to "see also" n.6.
26. See 11 U.S.C.s 506(a). For a review of the three approaches (roughly, retail,
wholesale and split-the-difference) used in the pre-Rash cases, see Kathyrn R. Heidt and
Jeffrey R. Waxman, The Supreme Court's Rash Decision Fails to Scrath the Valuation Itch,
53 Bus. LAW. 1345, 1347-52 (1998).
27. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d 1036, 1060 (5th Cir. 1996).
28. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1882, 1885.
29. See id. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Court cares about the result. The Court focuses on the fact that,
in a Chapter 13 cramdown, the debtor retains the collateral rather
than surrendering it to the secured party. Of course, this observa-
tion does not really advance normative analysis because one might
conclude that the appropriate valuation method would be to focus
on what the creditor could realize if it did get the property.
Instead, the Court chose to note the double risks that a secured
creditor bears in this situation (that the debtor may default and
that the property may in the meantime deteriorate) and to compare
those risks to the lack of continuing risk where the debtor surren-
ders property, allowing the creditor to liquidate it and reinvest the
proceeds as it sees fit.3° Although noting that the Bankruptcy
Code provides mechanisms to deal with the risk of debtor default
(through an appropriate interest rate on plan payments for
collateral) 31 and with the risk of collateral depreciation (through
adequate protection),32 the Court states that these mechanisms
"do not fully offset these risks."33  The more obvious reading of
the Code as a whole is that it provides methods, even if the Court
thinks them inadequate, to deal with the risks of debtor default on
a plan and of collateral depreciation and that it is inappropriate to
read the language of section 506(a) to inflate value to compensate
for supposed deficiencies in other Code mechanisms to deal with
secured creditors' risks.
The Court's other policy argument was to point out that the
debtor in the case retained the collateral to produce an income
stream (the collateral in question was a truck used in the debtor's
freight-hauling business). 4  This would not always be true in
30. See id. at 1885.
31. See id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (providing that the secured creditor
be paid the value of the collateral "as of the effective date of the plan," meaning present
value, so that the secured party must be paid interest on deferred payments of collateral
value). The interest rate on deferred payments should take into account the risk involved.
See United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1145 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding upward adjust-
ment of interest rate from a "riskless" rate to a rate that reflects risk of plan failure in the
context of a Chapter 12 cramdown); In re Fisher, 29 B.R. 542, 545-46 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983)
(using the same approach in Chapter 13 cramdown, with adjustment to reflect a market
perception of the risk involved in a coerced loan).
32. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1), 363(e).
33. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885. The Court fails to note a third Code mechanism
designed to minimize the risk of debtor default: the underused feasibility test for plan
confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).
34. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1882, 1886.
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Chapter 13," and, presumably, the Court does not mean to add
yet another uncertainty by suggesting the possibility that valuation
for Chapter 13 cramdown purposes might turn on whether the
debtor uses the collateral to generate income. Furthermore, even
where the debtor does so, that does not answer the question of who
should benefit from any surplus generated by income-producing
activity. As Justice Stevens explains in his Rash dissent, "Allowing
any more than the foreclosure value simply grants a general
windfall to undersecured creditors at the expense of unsecured
creditors."36  Debtors who pay less for their cars and other
collateral have more disposable income to pay unsecured creditors
in a Chapter 13 plan, and their plans are subject to challenge if
they do not commit all disposable income to the plan.37 The
Court Majority, however, fails to address this rather compelling
concern, that the big losers when the value of undersecured
creditors' collateral is inflated are the unsecured creditors and not
necessarily the debtor. At the margin, of course, higher valuation
of collateral can make collateral retention in Chapter 13 impossible.
The debtor may not have enough income to pay current expenses
and the collateral value. Thus, high valuation, with debtors
stretching to hold on to collateral, contributes to the high failure
rate in Chapter 1338 and forces some debtors into Chapter 7. In
Chapter 7, debtors can often discharge all unsecured debt and pay
nothing to unsecured creditors.39 Chapter 7 debtors do not
necessarily lose collateral because they may be able to reaffirm
secured debts,4° or secured creditors may acquiesce in repayment
35. One can argue about whether the car a debtor drives to work is used to produce an
income stream, but some debtors are unemployed and make plan payments out of pensions,
government relief, or trust funds, giving them "regular income" for Chapter 13 purposes.
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e); In re Hammond, 729 F.2d 1391, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984). Most courts
would allow nearly any Chapter 13 debtor, even one without a job, to keep a car as a
"reasonably necessary expense." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
36. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
38. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 90 (completion rate of only 32 percent in
Chapter 13); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy
as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 397, 411 (1994) (stating that a majority of Chapter 13 plans are not completed in all
regions of the country).
39. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727(a) (concerning nondischargeable debts and grounds for
global denial of discharge). See also Braucher, supra note 21, at 1-2, n.6 (more than 90% of
Chapter 7 debtors have no assets in excess of exemptions).
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).
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of the debt without reaffirmation.4 Debtors forced into Chapter
7, who nonetheless retain collateral, are better off financially
because they do not commit themselves to three- to five-year plans
and can discharge all unsecured debt.42 Although they may pay
the full debt amount to an undersecured creditor, they can pay
nothing on unsecured claims.
The Court Majority sails past Justice Stevens' point and does
not even note the impact of its decision on unsecured creditors,
stating, "The debtor in this case elected to use the collateral to
generate an income stream. That actual use, rather than a foreclo-
sure sale that will not take place, is the proper guide ... .
Thus, rather than the supposed absurdity of using a foreclosure that
will not take place as the measure of value, the Court chooses the
greater absurdity of measuring value by a replacement that will not
take place, thus redistributing wealth from unsecured to under-
secured creditors.
For purposes of determining what the bankruptcy courts
should do now that Rash has been decided as it has, the most
important language in the opinion is the Court's elaboration on
what it meant by "replacement value" in two difficult-to-reconcile
footnotes. This language is, if anything, more nonsensical than the
Court's policy analysis. In footnote five, as noted above, the Court
rejected "a ruleless approach allowing use of different valuation
standards based on the facts and circumstances of individual
cases."'  In footnote six, however, the Court qualifies a statement
41. See Braucher, supra note 13, at 179-80 (discussing advantages for debtors of
collateral retention in Chapter 7 rather than Chapter.13).
42. See id.
43. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 (1997). Four
commissioners of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission supported a proposal to
retain the Rash replacement value method of valuation, and they suffered from a similar
inability to engage with the impact of their recommendation on unsecured creditors. See
Recommendation for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy by Four Dissenting Commissioners,
Commission Report, supra note 15, at chapter 5, 46-47 [hereinafter Minority Report]. They
lament that the secured party loses its bargain when it does not get paid full retail price and
contrast that to the situation of unsecured creditors by saying that "unsecured claims are at
least valued (even if not necessarily paid) according to their contract terms." See id. at 47.
This notion misses the point that, in the unsecured portion of their claims, undersecured
creditors of course get the same treatment as unsecured creditors (valuation by reference to
the debt) because that is what they are. The dissenters sympathize with the undersecured
creditor's loss of bargain, but miss that unsecured creditors suffer the same loss.
44. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.5.
19981
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in the text that replacement value is "the cost the debtor would
incur to obtain a like asset, 45 by saying that it:
[L]eaves to bankruptcy courts, as triers of fact, identification of
the best way of ascertaining replacement value on the basis of
the evidence presented. Whether replacement value is the
equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or some other value
will depend on the type of debtor and the nature of the
property.46
The Court added that replacement value should not include
"certain items," a phrase explained only in terms of an example:
If retail value of a vehicle is used as the starting point to measure
a secured claim in a cramdown,
[a] creditor should not receive portions of the retail price, if
any, that reflect the value of items the debtor does not receive
when he retains his vehicle, items such as warranties, inventory
storage, and reconditioning.47
There is an intriguing side issue of what went wrong internally
at the Supreme Court in the production of this opinion. Were the
two footnotes afterthoughts? Were they perhaps responses to
internal queries among the justices? On the evidence of Rash, the
Supreme Court ought to abandon plain meaning interpretation of
language as impossible. Certainly the bankruptcy courts will have
to use some other method to make sense of this case.
Two large questions remain after Rash. The first and easier,
although not easy, question is: What does replacement value mean
in a Chapter 13 cramdown? The second is: What are the implica-
tions of Rash for collateral valuation in contexts other than Chapter
13 cramdown? Justice Stevens, in his Rash dissent, notes that
section 506(a) is a "utility" provision that operates in many
contexts. 48  Other important contexts for valuation include
adequate protection contests49 and the question of what secured
parties are entitled to be paid in a Chapter 11 plan, issues discussed
in Part IV below.5" First, Part III develops the argument that the
best way to reconcile footnotes five and six is to recognize that, as
45. See id. at 1886.
46. See id. at 1886, n.6.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1887 (J. Stevens, dissenting).
49. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1), and 363(e) (1994).
50. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
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a rule, after the kinds of deductions from retail value that the
Supreme Court thinks appropriate, what is left is wholesale value.
III. Valuation of Collateral at Wholesale for Purposes of
Chapter 13 Cramdown
The purpose of collateral valuation in a Chapter 13 cramdown
is to determine how much the debtor must pay the secured creditor
in the Chapter 13 plan. The Bankruptcy Code requires that the
debtor pay the present value of the allowed secured claim5" which,
under Section 506(a), is determined by the value of the collater-
al.52 As outlined in Part II, the Supreme Court held in Rash that
"replacement value" is the appropriate way to value collateral for
purposes of Chapter 13 cramdown 3 My argument is that this can
and should be equated with wholesale value. Since there is more
than one possible wholesale market, it is important to specify the
appropriate ones designated by the Supreme Court: those to which
the debtor has access and where the debtor could purchase
comparable property. 4  For example, a debtor could avoid
retailing costs by buying from another individual. An additional
component of my argument is that because of the pressing need for
a simple rule-recognized by the court-the bankruptcy courts
should treat value of motor vehicles as adequately proved by
reference to published "book" wholesale/trade-in value, absent
proof of special circumstances to the contrary. This is a value that
can be looked up and approximates the price in the designated
markets.
How exactly can we get from "replacement value" to whole-
sale value under the Supreme Court's analysis? The Court states
that "a simple rule of valuation is needed."55 Footnote six leaves
it to the bankruptcy courts to work one out. First, it should be
emphasized that footnote six specifically mentions wholesale value
as a possibility. Second, footnote six then gives an example in
which valuation begins with retail value and proceeds by subtract-
ing "certain items." The examples of certain items, ones that the
debtor should not have to pay for, are: warranties, inventory
51. See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
52. See id. § 506(a).
53. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1882.
54. See id. at 1882, 1886 n.6.
55. See id. at 1886 (quoting In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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storage, and reconditioning. The court gives in footnote six a single
explanation for these three examples of proper deductions from
retail value: they are "items the debtor does not receive." Where
a debtor keeps collateral in a cramdown, she obviously does not
receive reconditioning or warranties from the creditor,56 items that
she might get in a retail purchase. But what should be made of the
item "inventory storage"? Inventory storage is not something a
buyer ever receives from a retailer. It is a cost of the retail seller.
Therefore, the inclusion of the example "inventory storage" shows
that the Court wants the bankruptcy courts to subtract from retail
value the costs of retail selling-overhead, commissions, and any
other costs.
Retailers' profits should also be excluded under the Court's
reasoning. Return on investment is the cost a retailing business
pays to get capital. A debtor retaining collateral does not receive
a retail seller's profit; it must be excluded under the rationale of
footnote six. Ultimately, after subtracting everything that a debtor
does not receive, in the sense that the Court speaks of receiving, all
that is left is the wholesale value.
The most accurate evidence of wholesale value in most
Chapter 13 cases, taking into account the Court's direction in
footnote six to consider "the type of debtor," is probably the price
an individual buyer would pay another individual in a sale initiated
by running a classified advertisement or putting a sign in the
window of a car to be sold. This is a sale price an individual can
get; it also does not include costs of retailing, and in that sense, is
a wholesale price. As the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion has explained, sales by "want ad" or in a garage sale or flea
market are, by definition, not retail and, thus, are wholesale
markets. 57 Just as there are different retail markets (from Madi-
son Avenue boutiques to Walmart), there are different wholesale
markets. Some wholesale markets, such as dealer-only auctions,
are not accessible to individual debtors and, thus, should not be
used under the Supreme Court's analysis. Similarly, not everyone
who shops at Walmart could get buzzed into a Madison Avenue
boutique.
56. If the creditor is also a seller with warranty obligations, the debtor would have to
get the creditor-seller to reaffirm the contract to get continuing warranty protection. See 11
U.S.C. § 524(c).
57. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 251.
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The most accurate evidence in the consumer bankruptcy
context is not necessarily the best evidence, however. The problem
with using consumer-to-consumer sales as the measure of value for
collateral retained in Chapter 13 cramdowns is the cost of proof.
A debtor could not merely use proof of newspaper advertisements
because asking prices are not the same as actual sales.58 Judge
Easterbrook has correctly noted the need for a value that can be
looked up to avoid having the value of the asset paid to lawyers
rather than creditors.59  Furthermore, debtors in bankruptcy
usually cannot afford by-the-hour legal services, so that the effect
of requiring case-by-case proof to get a value less than retail would,
in practice, make retail the rule for most debtors, contrary to the
Supreme Court's analysis that deductions from retail should be
made.
Of possible published values, as will be more fully discussed,6 °
wholesale/trade-in "book" is closest to private consumer-to-
consumer sales. It is important to remember that when a debtor
holds on to collateral in Chapter 13, valuation is a strictly hypothet-
ical proposition, one that will not be tested in any actual market
transaction involving the particular property.6' Thus, valuation is
necessarily an approximate exercise. Gains in accuracy through
case-by-case determination using expert testimony and evidence of
actual individual-to-individual sales would be purchased at the high
cost of such proof, with many debtors effectively limited to a higher
published retail book value. Thus, the bankruptcy courts should
treat value of a motor vehicle as adequately proved by evidence of
wholesale/trade-in book value, with either party able to offer proof
that the collateral is worth more or less because it deviates from
average condition.
58. See In re McElroy, 210 B.R. 833, 836 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997).
59. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 248 n.271 (citing Judge Easterbrook's
luncheon address to the commission on July 17, 1997). Several bankruptcy courts trying to
make sense of Rash have stressed the importance of simplicity. See In re Glueck, 223 B.R.
514, 519 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998) ("it would be prohibitively costly to require expert
testimony for determination of value of every automobile in Chapter 13 proceedings"); In
re Oglesby, 221 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) ("due to the volume of Chapter 13
cases, a case-by-case analysis or determination of value is impractical."); and In re Younger,
216 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (quoted in text at n.98 infra).
60. See discussion infra notes 91-110.
61. See David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy
Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 64 (1991).
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What possibilities are there other than treating replacement
value as wholesale value? Post-Rash bankruptcy court cases
illustrate the range of judicial responses to this question and pick
these three measures as the presumptive rule: (1) retail book
value;62 (2) the average of retail and wholesale book value; 63 and
(3) any market accessible to debtors of the sort in question,
meaning, for consumer debtors, dealer retail sales, auctions open
to the public and sales between private parties.' All these cases,
not surprisingly, involve valuation of a motor vehicle. Usually
debtors cannot cram down their home mortgages because a
Chapter 13 provision bars modifying the rights of secured claim
holders where the loan is secured only by the principal residence
and not by other property such as personalty.65 Thus, cramdown
is most commonly used for car loans, and the debate over how to
value collateral retained in Chapter 13 has aptly been dubbed "Car
Wars.' '66  Occasionally various household items purchased on
secured credit also have to be valued for cramdown purposes.67
The least respectable of the three case approaches after Rash
is to peg replacement value of a motor vehicle at retail book value.
This is what the court did in In re Russell, using the N.A.D.A.
Guide retail figure.68 The one strength of Russell is that it states
a simple rule, a point the bankruptcy court made in its opinion.69
Alas, the simple rule of Russell is simply wrong. The debtor
argued, quite rightly, that footnote six of Rash required reductions
for "warranty costs, reconditioning costs and other similar retail
costs."7 ° For example, the court said that N.A.D.A. Guide retail
62. See In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997).
63. See In re Franklin, 213 B.R. 781 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997); In re Younger, 216 B.R.
649 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998); In re Glueck, 223 B.R. 514 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); In re
Oglesby, 221 B.R. 515 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
64. See In re McElroy, 210 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994). Sometimes home mortgagees make the mistake
of also taking personal property as collateral for the home loan, and this has the effect of
permitting the debtor to cram down the loan.
66. See David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation Standards in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Cases, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1996).
67. With many such items, there is no "retail" market involving professional sellers;
rather the market is flea markets and classified ads, wholesale methods of selling. See
Commission Report, supra note 15, at 250-51.
68. See In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12, 14 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997). See also supra note 17
(concerning the N.A.D.A. Guide).
69. See Russell, 211 B.R. at 14.
70. See id. at 13.
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value does not include reconditioning costs.71 Turning to the
inside of the front cover of the N.A.D.A. Guide, however, one
finds the following language in a publisher's note. "Appropriate
deductions should be made for reconditioning costs incurred to put
the vehicle in salable condition."72  Included in reconditioning
costs, according to the managing editor of the N.A.D.A. Guide, are
costs of any necessary body work, interior work, new tires,
mechanical repairs, and safety check.73 Both the retail and
wholesale values quoted in the N.A.D.A. Guide are based on prices
for vehicles where this work has been done prior to sale.74
The Russell court also said that N.A.D.A. retail value "does
not appear to include any extra value for items not retained by"
the debtor.75 It rejected the argument that retailing costs should
be subtracted when retail value is used as the starting point for
valuation.76  But this approach reads footnote six out of the Rash
opinion,77 a footnote that qualifies the statement that replacement
value should be measured by "the cost the debtor would incur to
obtain a like asset., 78  What is "inventory storage," an item that
the Supreme Court says should be deducted, but a cost of retailing?
Another simple rule, and a more defensible one, is to average
retail and wholesale book values, the approach of In re Franklin
79
and In re Younger.8" An interesting aspect of both cases is that
71. See id.
72. See N.A.D.A. Guide, supra note 17 (Eastern Edition, Jan. 1998).
73. See Erny Interview supra note 17.
74. See id.
75. See Russell, 211 B.R. at 13.
76. See id. at 14.
77. A slightly more defensible, but nonetheless troublesome, approach was taken in In
re Gates, 214 B.R. 467, 469, 472 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997), where the bankruptcy court allowed
the secured creditor to make out a prima facie case by producing a page from the N.A.D.A.
book showing retail book value and held that the burden then shifted to the debtor to prove
that a lower value should be used, a burden that the court said the debtor did not meet by
producing a page from the Kelley Blue Book showing wholesale/trade-in value. This
approach puts the burden of potentially expensive proof-expert testimony concerning the
costs of retailing-on a party little able to bear that cost, an individual debtor in bankruptcy.
Similarly, the court in In re McCutchen, 224 B.R. 373 (E.D. Mich. 1998), began with
N.A.D.A. retail book value and made deductions for replacement used tires and a cracked
windshield (items raised by the debtor) but not for other items included in the N.A.D.A.
retail price, see text at n.73 supra, or for retailing costs (such as inventory storage mentioned
as an example in Rash and similar items such as overhead generally, commissions and profit).
78. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 (1997).
79. See 213 B.R. 781 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
80. See 216 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998). See also In re Ogelsby and In re
Glueck, supra note 59.
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the bankruptcy courts in question had used the same approach
prior to the Rash decision.81 The Northern District of Florida,
which decided In re Franklin, had held in a pre-Rash opinion that
the "starting point in such valuation should be the average between
the retail and wholesale values, with upward or downward
adjustments made if called for by special circumstances.,12 The
court had used the price "on the open market, and not necessarily
at a retail sale from a dealer" and had recognized that dealer retail
prices include "advertising, repair, sales commissions, and other
costs of retail business., 83 In Franklin, the court determined that
the "open market" was still the appropriate measure and that Rash
did not dictate any change in methodology.' The court noted
that the Supreme Court in footnote six of Rash expressly recog-
nized that "several components go into retail pricing that should
not be included as a part of the replacement value of collateral,"
so that "the Supreme Court has allowed the bankruptcy courts to
move the appropriate measure of replacement value back to some
point between wholesale and retail values."85  This is not an
irrational attempt to make sense of Rash, but it should be noted
that Rash specifically rejected using a split-the-difference midpoint
and also said that replacement value does not include "items the
debtor does not receive," such as "inventory storage. ',16 Thus, a
more coherent reading of the case is that all retailing costs except
cost of goods should be deducted. This pushes replacement value
all the way back to wholesale value. Splitting the difference
between retail and wholesale deducts the value of some, but not all,
of what a debtor does not receive from a creditor when the debtor
retains collateral.
A third approach can be found in In re McElroy which
concluded that under Rash, "valuation should be based on prices
paid in the market that is accessible to the debtors, which includes,
without limitation, sales by dealers to the public, auctions open to
the public, and sales between private parties."87 The court notes
81. See Younger, 216 B.R. at 651; Franklin, 213 B.R. at 782.
82. See Franklin, 213 B.R. at 782.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 783.
86. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 n.6.
87. See In re McElroy, 210 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997).
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that this market is broader than "retail" market.8  Under this
approach, Chapter 13 debtors would not be well served if their
attorneys chose to measure payment to undersecured creditors by
retail value because a lower amount is acceptable. Of course, some
attorneys would do so to avoid the cost of proof of alternative
prices available and the possibility of a creditor challenge.89
The McElroy court makes a number of sophisticated observa-
tions about the difficulties of using retail dealers' prices as a
starting point. It notes these problems: (1) retail price may be set
either low or high, depending on whether the seller is also
providing financing and stands to make a profit on financing or,
alternatively, is making financing concessions; (2) retail prices may
be inflated to make up for inflated "trade-in" allowances; and (3)
retail prices may be stated as lower if the dealer also sells credit life
insurance or a warranty as part of the same transaction and stands
to make profits on either of those features.9"
In addition, the McElroy court discussed in detail the nature
of the information in one of the two major "books" on value, the
Kelley Auto Market Report Blue Book.91 The Kelley Blue Book,
the court noted, uses the term "retail" for "estimated asking price"
and "wholesale" for a "fully reconditioned" vehicle.92 In contrast
to the N.A.D.A. Guide,93 Kelley's retail book value is not based
even in part on actual sales, but on higher asking prices.94 An
expert witness in the McElroy case testified that dealers price
vehicles in order to allow room for bargaining because buyers
expect to bargain. 95 Another expert testified that asking prices
are used in the Kelley Blue Book because dealers will not give
information on their business practices concerning financing
concessions and profits, trade-in agreements, and insurance sales.
Therefore, it is not possible to determine pure sale prices with
these factors excluded.96
88. See id.
89. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
90. See McElroy, 210 B.R. at 835-836.
91. See id. at 836-37.
92. See id. at 836, n.3.
93. See Erny Interview, supra note 17. Ms. Erny said that Kelley states that its retail
column is for asking price while the N.A.D.A. Guide strives in its retail column to
approximate actual sales prices by retail dealers.
94. See McElroy, 210 B.R. at 836.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 837 n.5.
19981
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In short, both "retail" and "wholesale" values in Kelley's Blue
Book are too high to be perfectly correct under Rash. "Retail"
value reflects asking prices, not what buyers actually pay. Even
"wholesale," as that term is used, includes full reconditioning,
something Rash says debtors should not have to pay for when they
keep collateral in Chapter 13. Debtors do not get a reconditioned
vehicle when they keep collateral.
While sophistication and simplicity are not universally at odds,
they do appear to be in conflict when it comes to valuing collateral
for purposes of a Chapter 13 cramdown, and that is the trouble
with the McElroy analysis. It seems to require experts to testify
concerning actual sale value, preferably including evidence of actual
comparable sales.97 Judge Lindsay, in In re Younger, had this to
say of the McElroy analysis:
The methodology employed . is comprehensive and its
uniform application would undoubtedly result in fairly accurate
valuation in conformity with the directive of Rash. Its depen-
dence upon the availability of expert testimony and actual sales
prices in every case, however, in this court's view, makes it
impractical and virtually impossible to implement as a rule of
broad, general application.9'
The court in McElroy is certainly correct in noting the
deficiencies of published book retail values. The Kelley Blue Book
retail column is for asking prices, and both books include recondi-
tioning costs in the values listed for both retail and wholesale and
retailing costs in the values listed for retail. Neither book includes
the cost of warranties, but the N.A.D.A. retail values do reflect the
fact that even though a dealer does not formally give a warranty,
it may have informal policies of allowing exchanges or of standing
behind the sale to some extent, according to the managing editor
of the N.A.D.A. guide.9
There are also problems with wholesale book values, but, on
balance, they seem to cancel each other out. What does wholesale
book really reflect? The N.A.D.A. Guide's wholesale/trade-in
97. See id. at 836-37 & n.5 (discounting one expert's testimony because he "did not
provide a good explanation for why he could not obtain information from private parties
regarding actual sales prices and aspects of those sales that would require price adjustments
to determine the cash price indicated by the sale").
98. See In re Younger, 216 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998). For other cases
stressing the need for a simple approach, see n.59 supra.
99. See Erny Interview, supra note 17.
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column is based on many considerations including: dealer-only
auctions, actual sales information from used car dealers, prices in
off-lease sales, asking prices in a survey of dealers' newspaper
advertisements, the market influence of new-car pricing (including
rebates and special lease terms), and general economic information
(including volume of consumer debt and seasonal consider-
ations).1" Because both major books attempt to price wholesale
based on a fully reconditioned vehicle, the market they approxi-
mate most closely is a sale by a wholesale dealer to a retail dealer.
These sales occur in a highly competitive, information-rich
context.1 °1 Price sensitivity is great, and, therefore, individual
trade-in sales by a consumer to a dealer may be higher or lower
than dealer-to-dealer wholesale prices.1" Greater information
may drive prices up in the dealer-to-dealer context, compared to
trade-ins, while volume transactions may drive prices down.1 °3
Because dealer-to-dealer sales may be higher or lower than trade-
ins, the N.A.D.A. Guide equates them.1°4 The "trade-in" that the
N.A.D.A. Guide pictures is one where the price is an accurate
reflection of wholesale value (but with reconditioning done by the
seller, which would often not be the case in a trade-in) and not an
inflated amount to encourage the sale of another vehicle.10 5
For any published book value, there is a legitimate question
whether stated values favor industry members who are the
predominant subscribers. It is highly unlikely, for example, that the
N.A.D.A. Official Used Car Guide, published by a for-profit
106subsidiary of an industry trade association, states values unfa-
vorably for automobile dealers, and, thus, it is appropriate to be
cautious about treating industry figures as "the truth." We might
expect that industry "retail" values would be on the high side (and
certainly the use of asking prices in the Kelley Blue Book is
consistent with that prediction) because industry participants are
always on the selling side of transactions.
A reason to choose wholesale book value rather than retail is










to-dealer wholesale sales have industry players on both sides of the
deal. The largest category of subscribers to the N.A.D.A. Guide
is dealers who use it as a guide to buying and selling."0 7 Dealers
sell at retail, but they both buy and sell at wholesale.
As previously noted, the Rash analysis in many ways seems to
point to using private sales, from individual to individual, as the
basis of replacement value. Unfortunately, this would be expensive
for debtors to establish. It is worth asking, then, what the
relationship is between private sale prices and the published book
values, retail and wholesale, or wholesale/trade-in. Retail book
value is likely to be much too high to approximate private sales
because of the inclusion of retailing costs in retail pricing and also
because there is value to buyers in dealing with a business which
may stand behind the product to some extent even when it does
not provide a warranty.10 8 The Kelley Blue Book has the addi-
tional problem of being based on asking prices.
Is wholesale book value likely to be reasonably close to private
sales prices? The editors of the N.A.D.A. Guide do not attempt to
track this information,1"9 but there are good reasons to believe
that there is a close approximation. Although one might guess that
private sellers would hope to get more than wholesale value to
compensate for their selling efforts, dealers often would not give a
private seller the full book wholesale value because that value
includes reconditioning that the private seller does not provide.
Therefore, selling at wholesale book value to another individual
would mean the private seller would do better than she could in a
sale to a dealer. In making sales, private sellers have no expertise
in selling and limited information, and they often do not want to
wait very long to make a sale; all these factors drive prices down.
Private sellers are unlikely to get much more for a vehicle than
wholesale book value.
107. See id. The next largest category of subscriber is insurance companies, which use
the retail column in determining the value of totaled vehicles under replacement insurance,
on the assumption that an insured will purchase a vehicle from a dealer after an accident.
See id. This is not the same as "replacement value" in Rash, where no actual replacement
is to occur and the debtor simply retains the collateral. The third largest subscriber category
for the N.A.D.A. Guide, supra note 17, is financial institutions, which use the "loan value"
column, a figure which simply states 90 percent of wholesale because this is the auto lending
industry standard for loan to value ratio. See Erny Interview, supra note 17.
108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (concerning this point made by Ms. Erny).
See also Erny Interview, supra note 17.
109. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. See also Erny Interview, supra note 17.
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In summary, the use of book wholesale value avoids the risk
of inflated values desirable to industry players, a problem with
retail book value. Wholesale book value seems to be adjusted to
about the price an individual would pay to buy a vehicle from
another individual in a private sale. The individual seller who gets
wholesale book value obtains more than he could in a trade-in
(because book value includes reconditioning) and thus gets
compensated for his selling efforts. The use of this book value
serves the purpose of making valuation, as frequently as possible,
something that can be looked up.
Certainly Chapter 13 debtors should be permitted to provide
proof of actual sales of comparable property to individuals at lower
prices than wholesale "book." Similarly, they should be permitted
to prove the need for adjustments when their vehicles are in worse
shape than the average vehicle, and creditors should be permitted
to prove better than average condition. Simpli~ity and fairness are
best served, however, by making "wholesale" book, with adjust-
ments for mileage that are stated in the books, an acceptable level
of prima facie proof.
This approach allows implementation of the recommendation
of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, which noted a
number of policy reasons to pick wholesale value as the appropri-
ate measure of the worth of collateral.110 If value is set too high
or too low, this may create perverse incentives."' As the Com-
mission Report explains:
If creditors can count on property valuations well in excess of
the creditors' state law entitlements, then they have an incentive
to push for bankruptcy rather than out-of-court workouts. At
the same time, if property valuations in bankruptcy will be far
below what the debtor could yield by selling the property, the
debtor can use bankruptcy to extract value from creditors in
ways that are not consistent with bankruptcy principles. A clear
standard pegged at a compromise point is most likely to keep
strategic maneuvering by either party to a minimum.11
Despite the many problems with using retail value, two bills
introduced in the 105th Congress would have codified retail value
as the measure of value in Chapters 7 and 13 of property acquired
110. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 250-55.
111. See id. at 252.
112. See id. at 252-53.
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for personal, family, or household use.113 The problems include
the point made by the Commission, creating an incentive for
secured creditors to be less cooperative outside bankruptcy, and
also the likelihood that debtors, because of the cost of proof, would
use retail book value despite the risk of industry-oriented inflation
of value in published retail book values. Other problems with the
bills' approach include: the technical problem that, for some types
of used consumer property, there is no retail value because retailers
do not sell it;" 4 and the policy objection that it is particularly
questionable to use retail value in some Chapter 7 and 13 contexts,
such as when the debtor surrenders the property11 or when the
debtor pays its full value in a lump sum."6
113. See H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 111 (1997) (introduced by Rep. McCollum); H.R. 3150,
105th Cong. § 129 (introduced by Rep. Gekas). Both of these bills proposed to make
"replacement value" the measure of value in all Chapter 7 and 13 contexts and would have
also provided that, in the context of property acquired for personal, family, or household
purposes, replacement value means retail value. Interestingly, this would have left undefined
the meaning of replacement value in business collateral Chapter 13 cases such as Rash where
the debtor acquired a truck for use in a freight hauling business.
The Conference Report on H.R. 3150, H. Rept. 105-794, proposed in Sec. 123 to
require payment of the full debt, even if greater than retail value of the collateral, thus
eliminating cramdown in Chapter 13. This provision came from S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998),
§ 302(b). Ultimately, no major consumer bankruptcy legislation was enacted in the 105th
Congress. Cramdown is one of the incentives to use Chapter 13, so eliminating it might
decrease Chapter 13 filings (with some increase in Chapter 7 filings). A provision for full
debt repayment, regardless of collateral value, for at least nominally secured creditors would
also create an incentive for creditors to take security interests valueless outside bankruptcy,
for example by adding a security agreement to every credit card charge slip to create security
interests in everything from tennis shoes to towels and sheets.
114. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) 1994) (providing for a debtor to surrender collateral
to the secured party which, under the proposed bills, might result in an undersecured
creditor's deficiency and, thus, its unsecured claim being measured by reference to retail
value even though the secured creditor would be unlikely to realize more than wholesale
value).
116. This would be true with redemption in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (providing
for lump-sum redemption in certain circumstances). A post-Rash bankruptcy court case
distinguished Chapter 7 redemption from Chapter 13 cramdown on the basis of the reasoning
of Rash that cramdown exposes the secured creditor to double risks of future default and
deterioration of the property, neither of which is present in a lump-sum redemption. See In
re Donley, 217 B.R. 1004, 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998). The Donley court held that the
collateral should be valued for redemption purposes at the value the creditor could get for
it upon repossession and resale. See id. In Donley, because of special problems involved in
removal (of two joined mobile homes without wheels or even axles), the collateral was worth
$10,000 on a replacement value basis but only $1,250 if the creditor repossessed and sold it.
See id. See also In re Williams, 224 B.R. 873 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998) (same analysis as in
Donley, but applied to a case where the debtor only asked for the mid-point of wholesale
and retail as the value of collateral for Chapter 7 redemption purposes).
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Perhaps the most compelling reason to use wholesale value to
measure collateral value in Chapter 13 cramdowns is to equalize
the amount that secured creditors obtain from collateral under state
law and the Bankruptcy Code. On first thought, this goal suggests
use of foreclosure value when a debtor retains collateral in
bankruptcy because, absent the bankruptcy, the secured creditor's
rights would be to repossess and foreclose. But foreclosure values
are often artificially depressed and do not reflect what secured
creditors actually realize on collateral. As Donald Rapson, a
member of the Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9
Drafting Committee and a credit company lawyer, has explained,
frequently the only participant in a foreclosure sale is the creditor,
and in that context the creditor "may merely make a pro forma
nominal or minimal credit bid to buy-in the collateral."'' 7 Rap-
son adds that after the creditor bids in on the collateral at the
foreclosure sale, the creditor will "then resell it to a dealer at a
private sale-usually for its wholesale value as adjusted by its
present condition."'' 8 Interestingly, the bankruptcy court in Rash
seemed to understand this reality, finding that what the secured
creditor could realize upon foreclosure is the wholesale value. n 9
The creditor's realization on the collateral is, in actuality, recovered
on the second sale to a dealer, at wholesale.' This is why
foreclosure sale price is too low a value to use in a Chapter 13
cramdown. It is true that, outside bankruptcy, courts applying
Article 9 may permit secured creditors who bid at foreclosure sales
to recover deficiency judgments based on the difference between
the debt and the foreclosure sale price despite the fact that the
latter price is "economically irrelevant"'' 1 to the secured creditor.
This is a major flaw in state secured credit law and one that helps
117. See Donald J. Rapson, Deficient Treatment of Deficiency Claims: Gilmore Would
Have Repented, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 499 (1997).
118. See id. at 504.
119. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 149 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1993).
120. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 253, also making this point. ("Choosing
wholesale protects secured creditors at least for the resale price, which some argue is the
most accurate reflection of state law entitlements.").
121. See Rapson, supra note 117, at 517-18 (quoting the May 1996 report of the Revised
Article 9 subcommittee on consumer issues, that stated, "the actual 'price' paid at the
foreclosure sale is economically irrelevant to [secured creditors] except as it fixes the amount
of deficiency").
19981
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:4
to create business for the bankruptcy system from debtors seeking
refuge from inflated deficiency judgments.
A lonely, even if unintentional, strength of the Supreme
Court's Rash decision is that it avoids treating foreclosure sale price
as economically important; in an ideal world, state secured credit
law would recognize this point and base deficiencies on wholesale
value, the usual true recovery of creditors on collateral. In the
Revised Article 9 drafting process, completed in 1998, consumer
advocates would, of course, have been thrilled by a rule that
collateral must be valued at wholesale, taking into account
condition, because-in addition to setting value higher than secured
creditors do now when they calculate deficiencies-this approach
would avoid the fact-sensitive issue under Article 9 of whether the
sale was "commercially reasonable." '122 In the Article 9 context,
however, creditors view wholesale as too high a measure of
collateral value;'23 in a Chapter 13 cramdown, of course, whole-
sale is too low to suit creditors. The fairest approach would be to
treat wholesale as the measure of collateral value in both con-
texts.'24
122. See Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles
2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 136-38 (reporting depressed values
obtained in foreclosure sales in relation to wholesale price and noting necessity of "long and
fact-sensitive litigation" to challenge the reasonableness of a sale). See also U.C.C. § 9-
504(3) (1996) (requiring that every aspect of a disposition of collateral must be "commercial-
ly reasonable") and Revised Art. 9, § 9-610(b) (1998 Official Text) (same).
123. See Rapson, supra note 117, at 538 (urging secured creditors to accept the objective
merits of the proposition that foreclosure sale price does not reasonably reflect the value of
the collateral when there is a lack of genuine competitive bidding at foreclosure sales).
124. See also Commission Report, supra note 15, at 243, 255-57 (recommending that fair
market value, less hypothetical costs of sale, be used as the measure of worth of real
property collateral and explaining that typically there is not a wholesale market for real
estate, so that the equivalent of wholesale value for real estate is "retail" less expenses. See
id. at 256). The same result can be reached under Rash by starting with retail price and
deducting elements of the price that the debtor retaining collateral does not receive, i.e., the
costs of retail selling. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, post-Rash, upheld a Bankruptcy
Court's valuation of collateral, for purposes of a Chapter 11 cramdown, that did not deduct
hypothetical sales costs. See In re Mulvania, 214 B.R. 1 (B.A.P. 9th Circ. 1997). The trouble
with the B.A.P.'s analysis is that it never states what basis of valuation the bankruptcy court
used or what the collateral was, except that it included automobiles. If the bankruptcy court
started with wholesale value, then the B.A.P. analysis is sound under Rash. But if the
bankruptcy court started with retail price, then footnote 6 of Rash directs that "the value of
items the debtor does not receive," including retailing costs such as "inventory storage,"
should be deducted.
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IV. The Implications of Rash Beyond Chapter 13 Cramdown
The more difficult question after Rash is what, if any, implica-
tions this decision has in contexts other than Chapter 13 cramdown,
particularly when debtors keep collateral in Chapter 11. In both
Chapter 13 and Chapter 11, the two major valuation issues are
value of collateral for purposes of cramdown and for purposes of
adequate protection. 2 ' Adequate protection is not particularly
complex in the typical Chapter 13, in which a secured creditor has
an interest in one or a few pieces of collateral. As the Supreme
Court noted in Rash, adequate protection payments protect the
secured creditor against depreciation,126 so that if the debtor
defaults on Chapter 13 plan payments and the secured creditor gets
the collateral at that time, it will not be worse off than if the
collateral has been turned over earlier. If the plan payments are
based on wholesale value, as suggested in Part III above, then the
question for adequate protection purposes is whether that rate of
payment keeps pace with depreciation.127 If not, payments should
be increased, with the effect that the secured party's claim would
be amortized more quickly.
In Chapter 11, the major valuation questions are also cram-
down and adequate protection. Rash put a great deal of emphasis
on the debtor's continued use of collateral in Chapter 13 to
generate income."8 Continued use by the debtor to generate
income would also be true in Chapter 11, whether the issue is
cramdown or adequate protection. Adequate protection issues may
be more complex in Chapter 11, however, because there is typically
a long pendency period between the filing of a petition and
confirmation of a plan and because the collateral may be worth
considerably more used in a business than it would be if released
to the secured party. The big unanswered questions, then, are
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (setting the secured party's entitlement in
Chapter 11 at collateral value) and §§ 362(d)(1) and 363(e) (concerning adequate
protection).
126. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
127. But see In re Jenkins, 215 B.R. 689 (Bankr. N.D. Texas 1997) (using book retail
value as the basis of collateral valuation for purposes of adequate protection in Chapter 13,
on the rationale that retail is also the appropriate basis of value for cramdown purposes, not
withstanding Rash's direction to deduct items the debtor does not receive, including the
example of "inventory storage," a cost of retailing).
128. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885-86 (retaining a truck in a freight hauling business).
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what, if any, implications Rash has for Chapter 11 cramdown or
adequate protection.
Collier on Bankruptcy has been so bold as to offer "answers"
to these questions. On the question of what a secured party must
be paid in a Chapter 11 cramdown, it states:
Following Rash, to fix the amount of the claim for payment
purposes, the relevant methodology should be that of a
hypothetical purchase by the debtor (i.e., replacement value).
As the Court has explained, this requires the valuing court to
determine "the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade,
business, or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain
property of like age and condition." '129
But this answer may not stand the test of time. In Chapter 11,
the debtor is usually a business, and replacement value may be a
low alternative among the possible measures of value, one that
equates with wholesale. Pre-Rash Chapter 11 case law often favors
a "going concern" value.130  For example, if the collateral is
inventory, it might be valued at the retail price at which the debtor
could sell the collateral in the course of business, rather than at the
wholesale price at which the debtor bought it, even though the
difference reflects not the intrinsic value of collateral but the value
added by the debtor. Rash involved a single piece of equipment,
a truck, property that declines in value through use. In contrast, if
the collateral is inventory or accounts, as inventory is sold and
accounts are generated, a business debtor increases the value of
collateral over historical costs. This difference in proposed
129. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 506.03(7)(d), at 81 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1997) (citations omitted). Collier adds, "because a sale is not to occur, the hypothetical costs
of a sale should not be deducted." See id. However, the Supreme Court in Rash held only
that net foreclosure price is not the appropriate measure of Chapter 13 cramdown value and
the Court directed in footnote 6 the costs of a seller, items such as "inventory storage,"
should be deducted from replacement value. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 118 n.6.
130. See Carlson, supra note 66, at 3-4 ("The prodigal weight of authority in chapter 11
cases favors going concern value ... ); Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford
Institution for Savings, 50 F.3d 72, 74-75 & nn. 2-3 (1st Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). But see
James F. Queenan Jr., Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11, 92 CoM.
L.J. 18, 19 (1987) (objecting to using the label "going concern" for retail value, and reserving
that term for the enterprise value of a business sold as an entity rather than piecemeal).
Judge Queenan argues that valuation of collateral in Chapter 11, whether for cramdown or
adequate protection, should be by reference to a commercially reasonable disposition by the
secured party, unless the debtor is actually selling its business as a going concern in a
Chapter 11 plan. See id. at 32-34, 43, 62-63. See also In re Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 5-6 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1990) (using public auction value in adequate protection challenge in Chapter 11).
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disposition could justify a forward-looking method of valuation for
inventory and accounts. Similarly, if the collateral is real estate
that the debtor bought and then developed, a "going concern"
approach might value it based either on the price of units to be
sold or, if units were to be leased, based on the income stream. If
the collateral is appreciating or represents all or a substantial
portion of the assets of a business, again, a forward-looking value
might be deemed appropriate, particularly if the reorganized
business is doing well. In short, differences in context might lead
the Supreme Court to follow the "going concern" approach when
valuing collateral for purposes of Chapter 11 cramdown.
As for adequate protection valuation, the Collier "answer"
post-Rash is to assert that value should be determined in accor-
dance with a hypothetical sale method, that is, in a sale by the
secured party, with a deduction of costs of sale.131 The treatise
derives this answer from the purpose of adequate protection, to
protect the secured creditor in the event the debtor fails to pay and
the creditor has to foreclose to realize value.132 The treatise
concedes, however, that "this approach might be criticized as
collapsing the 'use or disposition' question with the question of
'purpose.' ' 133 Again, the Supreme Court might choose to empha-
size that when adequate protection is sought, the debtor proposes
to continue to use the collateral, and the Court might, therefore,
conclude that the debtor must pay a value based on that use. That
value might be replacement value or, again, based on the difference
in context, a higher value that the debtor could obtain through use
or sale or collection in the course of its business. An additional
wildcard is what to make of the Court's reliance on the inadequacy
of adequate protection as the basis for choosing replacement value
for cramdown purposes in Rash."3  Perhaps an implication of
Rash is that adequate protection analysis should be left as is,
inadequate in the Court's view.
. In asserting answers to these questions raised by Rash, Collier
ventures into the realm of the occult. Without a crystal ball, one
cannot say what application the Supreme Court might give its Rash
131. See COLLIER, supra note 129, 506.03(7)(a), at 61.
132. See id. at 60.
133. See id.
134. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (1997).
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analysis in Chapter 11. The National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion's conclusion is more cautious in its reading:
Issues involving the valuation of property arise in almost every
bankruptcy case, consumer or business. Valuation is central to
adequate protection contests and to the plan confirmation
process, and thus greatly affects negotiations in complex
business reorganization cases. Although section 506(a) estab-
lishes that valuation is to be done on a case-by-case basis, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 506(a) calls into
question the valuation standards heretofore used in all of these
contexts.
135
The Commission also reports fears that Rash "will exacerbate
litigation on valuation issues.' ' 136 To stem the tide, it proposes
that the same standards be employed for all valuation purposes in
all bankruptcy chapters, meaning wholesale value for all personal
property and fair market value less costs of sale for real proper-
ty,137 no matter the chapter or the issue. It defends this sweeping
proposal, which is buried in the Consumer Bankruptcy chapter of
its report, not so much with a rationale as with a line of Socratic
questioning:
There has been little explanation for why one valuation
standard should be used for adequate protection and another
for plan confirmation, one for determining the value of non-
exempt property and another for the redemption of exempt
property. Nor has there been an adequate argument made for
why Chapter 13 valuations should be any different than
valuations in Chapter 11 or any other chapter. Without a
clearly articulated principle to justify the propriety of various
valuation standards in different procedural contexts, confusion
is compounded with no offsetting gain. 31
These are good questions, and ones that require more elaboration
than I propose to offer here. The Commission Report in this
passage seems to put the burden of proof on defenders of -the
murky status quo: give a clear principle, or a unitary solution
135. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 247 (footnotes omitted).
136. See id. 247-48.
137. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (concerning the Commission's real
property recommendation and how the same result can be achieved under Rash).
138. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 248-49.
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should be legislated. Rather, the burden of proof should be on
anyone proposing to change to a unitary approach.
Interestingly, the Commission minority also recommends an
across-the-board approach, albeit it a different one.'39 The
minority concedes, however, that "[a] good argument can be made
that the 1978 Code, in addressing the complexity of valuation,
deliberately left the statutory language fuzzy in order to preserve
judges' flexibility to determine valuation in different circumstanc-
es.' 14  The bills in the 105th Congress that addressed valuation
confined their provisions to consumer Chapter 7 and 13 cases or to
Chapter 13 only,'4 ' perhaps lending support to the deliberate
vagueness thesis concerning Chapter 11 valuation issues.
What should bankruptcy courts do about Chapter 11 valuation
in the meantime? Judge Queenan has referred to valuation as "an
arcane art,"'' 42 and there is a good case for leaving it that way.
We can start by remembering the legislative history of Section
506(a). The Senate Report states:
While courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case
basis, the subsection makes it clear that valuation is to be
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and the
proposed disposition or use of the subject property. This
determination shall be made in conjunction with any hearing on
such disposition or use of property or on a plan affecting the
creditor's interest. To illustrate, a valuation early in the case in
a proceeding under sections 361-363 would not be binding upon
the debtor or creditor at the time of confirmation of the
plan.
143
The House Report states:
"Value" does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or
liquidation value of the collateral; nor does it imply a full going
concern value. Courts will have to determine value on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the
competing interests in the case.' 44
139. See Minority Report, supra note 43, at 44-45 (recommending replacement value for
personal property and assessed value for real property).
140. See id.
141. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
142. See Queenan, supra note 130, at 18.
143. See S. REP. No. 989, at 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854.
144. See H.R. REP. No. 595, at 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6312.
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With this grant of discretion to act equitably, bankruptcy
judges should continue to keep the big picture in mind. There are
competing interests in a business reorganization, with risk to
secured creditors to be balanced against potential gains to others,
including unsecured creditors and reliance interests such as
employees, 145 customers, suppliers, taxing authorities, and others
in the community where the debtor business is located. Rash has
nothing to say about how to balance these interests. It addressed
a valuation issue in a Chapter 13 cramdown, where the debtor
could continue to work by retaining the collateral, a truck used in
his business. In Chapter 13, the plan is typically filed with the
petition, or at any rate within fifteen days,1" and payments
typically begin within thirty days.1 47 An adequate protection issue
early in a Chapter 11 case, where it may be many months before
a plan can be proposed, is a very different matter. A low valuation
at this stage, finding no equity cushion and thus resulting in a need
for estate-draining adequate protection payments or even ending
the case, may be appropriate where a successful reorganization is
quite apparently a pipe dream; whereas, a higher valuation, based
in part on income-producing potential of collateral, can be justified
where prospects for reorganization are good or as yet undetermin-
able.
As for Chapter 11 cramdown, there is something to be said for
the leverage-value of some degree of uncertainty about valuation,
serving as a prod to negotiated solutions. Chapter 11 plans are
typically negotiated in the shadow of a cramdown as the alterna-
tive." Again, Rash has nothing to say about the dynamics of this
complex process, and bankruptcy courts should certainly not feel
constrained to apply its valuation approach, replacement value less
"certain items," in the completely different context of Chapter 11.
There is not the same need for a clear rule in Chapter 11 as in
consumer cases, and equitable balancing to facilitate plan confirma-
tion is desirable and workable here. In short, caution about
applying Rash in Chapter 11 is appropriate.
145. See id. at 220 (mentioning preserving jobs as a goal of Chapter 11).
146. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1994).
148. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
[Vol. 102:4
BANKRUPTCY VALUATION OF COLLATERAL
V. Conclusion
Bankruptcy courts face the perplexing task of applying the
Rash analysis to valuation of collateral for purposes of Chapter 13
cramdown. The Supreme Court's valuation method in that case is
replacement value149 less "certain items."15  Examples of items
to be excluded are "items the debtor does not receive when he
retains his vehicle, items such as warranties, inventory storage and
reconditioning."'' When all items a debtor does not receive are
excluded, what is left is wholesale value. The bankruptcy courts
are given authority in Rash to identify the best way of ascertaining
replacement value, taking into account the type of debtor and the
nature of the property.152 In the context of the huge volume of
consumer and small business Chapter 13 cases, case-by-case
adjudication would not be feasible or fair. It is, therefore,
appropriate for bankruptcy courts to hold, or, preferably, to state
by local rule, that a prima facie case of value for Chapter 13
cramdown purposes is made out, in the case of motor vehicles,
when the debtor produces the relevant wholesale or whole-
sale/trade-in book value from a reputable published valuation guide
such as the N.A.D.A. Guide or Kelley Blue Book. 5 3 Proof of
special circumstances, such as better or worse than average
condition, could be offered by either party to attempt to establish
a different value.
Beyond the Chapter 13 cramdown context, great caution about
applying the Rash methodology is appropriate. In particular, the
Supreme Court in Rash did not consider the balance of interests
that come into play in a Chapter 11 reorganization or the complexi-
ty of the Chapter 11 process. Thus, its decision could easily be
distinguished in Chapter 11 valuation contests, and bankruptcy
courts should feel free to continue to exercise discretion to further
the goal of effectuating successful reorganizations where feasible.
149. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 1879, 1882 (1997).
150. See id. at 1886 n.6.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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